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The role of savings in economic development has been 
discussed extensively in the literature (for instance, see 
Lucas 1988; Romer 1986; Solow 1956). Despite the impor-
tance of high savings rates, World Development Indicators 
(WDI) reveal that savings rates declined and/or fluctuated 
across developing regions of the world, including East Asia 
and the Pacific, the Middle East and North Africa, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Europe and Central Asia, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) between 1970 and 2010. In addi-
tion, the ECOWAS region recorded little success in savings 
mobilization compared to other developing regions during 
the same period. Although inadequate savings undermines 
a country’s economic development (Adewuyi, Bankole, and 
Arawomo 2010) increased access to international capital can 
cushion the adverse effects of lower savings in an economy. 
Unfortunately, many SSA countries (including ECOWAS) are 
facing declines in international capital inflow as a results 
of factors that include lending constraints (Elbadawi and 
Mwega 2000), while the recent global financial crisis has 
further reduced the countries’ access to external resources.
Besides low savings, the ECOWAS region has witnessed 
political instability since the 1960s, when a number of coun-
tries attained independence, and up through the late 1980s 
due to frequent military interferences in politics (Edi 2006). 
The region has also seen changes in government (elected 
or military) more than any other region on the African con-
tinent due mainly to military coups. In the year 1985, for in-
stance, 11 ECOWAS countries had military governments (Edi 
2006). Other than military coups, ethnic and religious crises 
including civil wars appear to be common characteristics 
of ECOWAS countries. In particular, there were civil wars in 
Liberia (1989-96 and 1999-2003), Sierra Leone (1991-2002), 
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Guinea Bissau (1998) and Cote D’Ivoire (2002-2007 and 
2010-2011) (Zounmenou and Loua 2011). Also, between 
2009 and 2012, the military staged coups in Guinea Bissau, 
Mali and Niger, while Nigeria continues to contend with eth-
no-religious crises. The political crises facing these countries 
are due to lack of economic opportunities, youth unrest, or-
ganized crime, piracy, endemic corruption, higher spending 
on the military than basic services, disrespect for the rule 
of law and democratic principles by the ruling elite, human 
rights abuse, military interference in politics, and lack of in-
stitutional reforms (Akenroye 2012).
Though the literature has not adequately addressed the 
role of political instability in savings mobilization (Da Silva 
1998), political instability may be an important determinant 
of savings, particularly in ECOWAS countries. During periods 
of political instability, government and policy makers usu-
ally make sub-optimal and short-term macroeconomic poli-
cies, including switching policies, and in the process create 
volatility which has negative consequences on the econo-
my (Aisen and Veiga 2013; Alesina et al. 1996). These conse-
quences include low production and income, and declining 
welfare (Alesina and Perotti 1996), as well as poor invest-
ment and growth (Barro 1991; Campos and Nugent 2003) 
all of which tend to lower savings. Da Silva (1998) opined 
that instability increases a state’s discretionary power to the 
extent that the state violates the individual’s property rights 
or fails to enforce their rights, including non-guaranteeing 
of contracts such as savings and investment. Political insta-
bility also increases the perceived uncertainties/risks associ-
ated with savings and investment because it may prevent 
people from enjoying the returns/incomes from their sav-
ings/investment, and therefore lead to lower future savings.
Edwards (1996) argued that a higher probability of 
changes in the government/party in power (political insta-
bility) reduces the incentives to save. The author maintained 
that, since savings only translates after a lag into investment, 
production and consumption, projects initiated by the gov-
ernment in power today may be completed and its benefits 
realized at a later date when the opposition party may have 
assumed power. If this happens, the credit of such projects 
usually goes to the opposition, even though it was initiat-
ed by the party previously in power. In addition, Edwards 
(1996) pointed out that political polarization (differences 
in political parties’ preferences) influences a government’s 
decisions to save. If the preferences of the party in power 
are similar to those of the opposition, there is a high ten-
dency that the party in power will save (even if there is a 
high probability of changes to the party in power) and vice 
versa. Therefore, it is common to see lower savings in politi-
cally unstable countries.
Given that income level varies across countries, the im-
pact of political instability on savings may depend on in-
come level. Mauro (1995) asserted that low income (poor) 
countries tend to be politically unstable, thus suggesting 
that high income moderates (lowers) the impact of politi-
cal instability in an economy. It also indicates that at high 
income levels countries may likely have a politically stable 
environment which in turn enhances overall economic 
performance, including promoting savings mobilization. 
Therefore, it is expected that for low income ECOWAS coun-
tries, higher income would lead to an improvement in politi-
cal stability and higher savings. 
The objective of this paper therefore is to examine the 
impact of political instability-income interaction on savings 
in the ECOWAS. We believe that focusing on the ECOWAS 
region will reduce the problem of heterogeneity found in 
many cross-country studies (Gyimah-Brempong 2002). The 
remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 
two highlights savings and political instability patterns in 
ECOWAS countries, while section three reviews the empiri-
cal literature on savings. Section four contains a theoretical 
framework and model, and section five presents results and 
discussion. Section six concludes the paper.
SAVINGS AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN  
ECOWAS COUNTRIES
As mentioned in the introductory section, the ECOWAS re-
gion has recorded little success in the mobilization of sav-
ings required to boost investment and growth. For instance, 
ECOWAS savings rates were lower than those of Latin 
American and the Caribbean, SSA and the world averages 
between 1970 and 2010. Similarly, two regions - East Asia 
and the Pacific and Europe and Central Asia, had higher sav-
ings rates compared to ECOWAS in 1980-2010 and 1990-
2010, respectively (Figure 1). 
In addition, at the individual level, many ECOWAS coun-
tries did not fare better as their savings rates were lower 
than both regional and world savings rates between 1970 
and 2010. Also, ECOWAS countries’ savings rates occasion-
ally fluctuated and declined during the same period (Figure 
2). Elbadawi and Mwega (2000) attributed the low savings 
rates in SSA countries (including ECOWAS) to low income 
per capita, a high young-age dependency ratio, and high 
dependence on aid.
Coupled with inadequate savings rates, is the political 
instability (military coups, political violence, civil wars, and 
ethno-religious crises) that has ravaged the region since 
the 1960s and has continued unabated. The rising political 
crisis and uncertainty in many developing countries have 
attracted the interest of notable organizations, institutions 
and groups, who later devised the mechanisms to meas-
ure the extent of perceived political uncertainties or risks 
in each country. One such organization is the Political Risk 
Service Group, which publishes the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG). The ICRG political risk rating (PRR) ranges 
between 0% and 100%. A PRR of 0.0%-49.9% implies a very 
high risk; 50.0%-59.9% a high risk; 60.0%-69.9% a moderate 
risk; 70.0%-79.9% a low risk; and 80.0% or more indicates 
a very low risk. Figure 3 shows the PRR for ECOWAS coun-
tries from 1999 to 2011. Gambia and Ghana appeared to be 
the least politically risky among ECOWAS countries, as their 
PRR was 60% and above during 1999-2011, but Gambia’s re-
cent rating suggests that it is heading towards becoming a 
high risk country. Also, Burkina Faso was rated above many 
countries in the region, with an average PRR of 60% during 
the same period. In the same vein, Sierra Leone had a better 
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political environment compared to most of its neighbors, as 
its rating stood at an average of 60%-65% during 2004-2010. 
In the case of Cote D’Ivoire and Guinea, their PRR indicates 
that political instability is on the rise. For example, Guinea’s 
PRR fell from almost 50% in 1999-2005 to less than 50% in 
2006-2011, while Cote D’Ivoire’s PRR declined continuously 
from 1999 to 2011. The PRR of Guinea Bissau stood at 51%-
57%, but recent ratings point to a worsening political situa-
tion in the country. Liberia’s low PRR reflects the instability 
faced by the country in the past, but the rating has shown 
a gradual improvement starting from 2006. Unfortunately, 
Africa’s most populous and richest country (Nigeria) had a 
very low PRR (less than 50%) from 1999 to 2011, signaling 
a highly politically unstable environment. Other countries 
such as Niger and Senegal fared better than Nigeria as they 
both had a PRR of 50%-60%. Though Mali’s PRR was 60% 
during 1999-2006, it has continued to decline since 2007.
In summary, available evidence suggests that low in-
come ECOWAS countries are politically unstable and 
have failed to mobilize the higher savings needed to raise 
Figure 1: Savings rates across developing regions
Source: Authors computation base on the WDI data
Figure 2: Savings rates across ECOWAS countries
Source: Authors computation base on the WDI data
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investment and growth. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
the region is highly underdeveloped, with unfavorable eco-
nomic conditions such as low income, high poverty, and un-
employment, to mention just a few.
REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON 
SAVINGS 
Many scholars have attempted to investigate the determi-
nants of savings across countries. For instance, Kelly and 
Mavrotas (2003) investigated the determinants of savings in 
17 African countries with a primary focus on financial de-
velopment. The authors employed a panel co-integration 
method and discovered that financial sector development 
has a positive effect on savings in the countries considered 
in their study. Also, Agenor and Aizenman (2004) employed 
the instrumental variable technique to examine the deter-
minants of savings in SSA countries during the period 1980-
1996. The results show that the terms of trade and income 
per capita have a positive effect on savings, while govern-
ment savings, financial development and foreign savings 
have a negative effect on savings.
Hondroyiannis (2006) assessed the main determinants 
of savings in 13 European countries from 1961 to 1998 by 
employing the panel co-integration technique. The author 
confirmed a positive effect of old-age dependency, govern-
ment budget, growth of real disposable income, real inter-
est rate and inflation rate on savings. In addition, the author 
discovered that liquidity constraints and financial develop-
ment have a negative impact on savings. Gutiérrez (2007) 
studied the determinants of savings in 9 Latin American 
countries from 1990 to 2003, using pooled OLS, fixed effects 
and random effects estimation techniques. The results illus-
trate that inflation rate, GDP growth, government balance, 
and financial depth have a positive impact on savings, while 
foreign savings has a negative effect on savings. Adewuyi, 
Bankole, and Arawomo (2010) examined the determinants 
of savings in ECOWAS countries during the period 1980-
2006, using pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects 
methods of analysis. The authors confirmed the negative 
impact of gross domestic income per capita, deposit rate, 
financial development, inflation, budget deficit and terms 
of trade on savings, while they showed that life expectancy 
has a positive effect on savings.
There are not many studies conducted to investigate the 
Figure 3: ECOWAS countries political risk rating
Source: Authors computation base on the ICRG data. Benin and Cape Verde are excluded
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impact of political instability on savings. But the few studies 
that have examined the relationship between the variables 
revealed that political instability has a negative impact on 
savings. For instance, Venieries and Gupta (1986) did a cross-
national study to examine the impact of income distribution 
and socio-political instability on savings. The authors con-
cluded that socio-political instability has a negative impact 
on savings. Similarly, Edwards (1996) established that po-
litical instability has a negative influence on savings in the 
sample of countries considered in his study. Also, Fielding 
(2003) evaluated the effect of several indicators of political 
instability on macroeconomic performance in Israel. The au-
thor found a significant and negative effect of political in-
stability on the saving behavior of Israelis. However, Radelet, 
Sachs, and Lee (1997) did not find any significant relation-
ship between political factors and saving rates in a sample 
of 72 countries.
It is glaring that researchers have not paid adequate at-
tention to the savings and political instability relationship, 
particularly in the ECOWAS, one of the world’s most politi-
cally unstable regions and least successful in savings mobi-
lization. In fact, Edwards (1996) considered only 4 ECOWAS 
countries, namely – Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Togo, 
while Venieries and Gupta (1986) included 5 countries – 
Cote D’Ivoire, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone in 
their analysis, thus ignoring other countries that are consid-
ered to be highly politically unstable in the region. Also, to 
our knowledge, researchers have yet to examine whether 
the impact of political instability on savings depends on in-
come level in ECOWAS countries. Thus, this paper extends 
the literature by investigating the impact of political insta-
bility on savings, including examining whether the impact 
of political instability on savings depends on income level 
in the ECOWAS region. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND MODEL
The savings model used in this paper was formulated on the 
basis of the ideas of Friedman’s (1957) Permanent Income 
Hypothesis (PIH) and Modigliani and Brumberg’s (1954) Life 
Cycle Hypothesis (LCH). In explaining the LCH, Ando and 
Modigliani (1963) emphasized that individuals accumulate 
wealth during their working years and make provisions for 
old age when they will no longer be able to earn income. 
Specifically, during young age, individuals earn low income 
relative to their consumption, and borrow to finance their 
consumption needs. In the second phase of their lifetime, 
individuals earn income higher than their consumption, 
pay back their debt and save/invest the remainder. The final 
phase is when individuals attain retirement (non-working) 
age and their incomes fall to zero. Thus, they will fall back 
on past savings or returns from their investment in order to 
maintain their consumption. Dirschmid and Glatzer (2004) 
asserted that the LCH assigns an important role to income 
and income growth, and the age structure of the population 
in explaining savings rates. On the other hand, the PIH states 
that permanent wealth is more important than current dis-
posable income in explaining individuals’ consumption. 
Another important assumption of the PIH is that permanent 
changes in income exert more influence on consumption 
than temporary changes in income. An important determi-
nant of permanent income is individuals’ assets categorized 
into both human (such as education) and non-human assets 
(for example, bonds, property, etc.).
Both the LCH and PIH appear to be identical in many as-
pects because they assume that forward-looking consumers 
plan for their future consumption by making an attempt to 
smooth-out consumption as much as they can due to varia-
tions in their income streams (Jappelli 2005; Pistaferri 2009; 
Rao and Sharma 2007). The obvious difference between the 
theories is that the LCH assumes that individuals do not live 
forever, while the PIH assumes that individuals live forever 
(Pistaferri 2009). And since individuals do not live forever in 
real life, both theories can be considered as one.
Given the issues raised above, an ideal savings model 
would consists of variables such as income (PCY) and in-
come growth (GPCY), and age structure of the population 
(AGE). Moreover, since it is assumed that consumers can 
borrow and save/invest part of their income, it implies that 
real interest rate (RIR) is also important when making con-
sumption/savings decisions and should be included in the 
savings model. Thus, the savings (GSR) model is specified as:
Following previous studies, the savings equation above 
is slightly modified to incorporate other important vari-
ables. Given that agriculture (AGR) is the major occupation 
in ECOWAS countries, the variable is also included in the 
model. Furthermore, since income is more uncertain in de-
veloping countries than developed countries (Athukorala 
and Sen 2004), inflation (INF) is included in the model to 
capture the level of uncertainty in the ECOWAS. Moreover, 
given that low income (poor) countries tend to be politically 
unstable (Mauro 1995) and have lower savings rates, it is 
possible that income level moderates the impact of politi-
cal instability on savings, so that in high income countries 
the effect of political instability on savings will be lower but 
higher in low income countries such as ECOWAS. Thus, po-
litical instability (POL) and a political instability-income in-
teraction (POL*PCY) are included in the savings model. The 
general savings model is:
The savings model above will be estimated using the panel 
model specified as follows:
Where it is the time period t in country i, and U is the er-
ror term. The variables are defined or measured as follows:
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GSR is the gross savings rates and dependent variable. It 
refers to gross (national) savings as a percentage of GDP. The 
data were collected from the WDI. However, data on Nigeria 
were obtained from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) due 
to its unavailability in the WDI. Although the LCH focuses on 
individual savings, it has been extended to study aggregate 
savings (see Bloom, Canning, and Graham 2003; Bloom et al. 
2007; Cook 2005). For instance, Bloom, Canning and Graham 
(2003) argued that it is difficult to aggregate over individual 
savings, and therefore used aggregate savings rates in their 
analysis. In line with this, Cook (2005) claimed that data on 
aggregate savings rates are widely available and are also 
likely to be more consistent. Thus, we employed aggregate 
savings rates.
PCY refers to income (GDP) per capita. The data were col-
lected from the WDI. The subsistence-consumption theories 
argue that savings rates tend to be higher in high income 
countries and lower in low income countries (Metin-Ozcan, 
Gunay, and Ertac 2003). Thus, we expect a negative rela-
tionship between income per capita and savings rates in 
ECOWAS countries.
GPCY is the income (GDP) growth rate. The data were 
collected from the WDI. The PIH predicts a negative relation-
ship between income growth and savings because forward 
looking consumers anticipate future increases in their per-
manent income, and therefore dissave against future earn-
ings. But the LCH asserts that increases in income growth 
have a positive effect on savings, since income growth in-
creases the savings of the working population relative to the 
non-working population (Metin-Ozcan, Gunay, and Ertac 
2003). Overall, we expect the relationship between income 
growth and savings rates to be either positive or negative.
INF refers to inflation rate. The data were collected from 
the WDI. Athukorala and Sen (2004) suggested that the im-
pact of inflation raises uncertainty about future incomes, 
leading to higher savings for precautionary purposes, par-
ticularly for households in developing countries whose in-
come prospects are much more uncertain than their coun-
terparts in developed countries. Also, if individuals seek to 
maintain a target level of wealth or liquid assets relative 
to income, savings will rise with inflation. Similarly, Metin-
Ozcan, Gunay, and Ertac (2003) suggested that macroeco-
nomic uncertainty (captured by inflation rate) is expected 
to have a positive effect on savings, as people try to hedge 
against risk by increasing their savings. This view is support-
ed by Skinner (1988) and Zeldes (1989). In the same man-
ner, Hondroyiannis (2006) suggested that in societies where 
income prospects are less uncertain, inflation may results in 
lower savings. Thus, we expect a positive relationship be-
tween inflation and savings rates.
RIR is the real interest rate. It is the nominal deposit rate 
adjusted for inflation rate. The data were obtained from the 
WDI. The LCH asserts that a rising interest rate raises the 
opportunity cost of current consumption, making the indi-
vidual consumer reduce current consumption and increase 
savings (substitution effect). But if a consumer is a net 
lender, increases in the interest rate lead to higher income 
and consumption, and results in lower savings (income ef-
fect). If the substitution effect outweighs the income effect, 
the relationship between interest rate and savings would 
be positive (Athukorala and Sen 2004; Nwachukwu and 
Egwaikhide, 2007). Therefore, we expect the relationship 
between savings rates and real interest rate to be either 
positive or negative.
AGE refers to age dependency rate. This variable is de-
fined as the ratio of the population below 15 years plus the 
population over 65 years to the working population (aged 
15-64 years). The data were obtained from the WDI. In ex-
plaining the LCH, Ando and Modigliani (1963) argued that 
individuals accumulate wealth during their productive/
working years and save (or make provisions) for retirement, 
since income is expected to fall during retirement. Thus, if 
the working population rises relative to non-working (de-
pendent) population, savings will rise and vice versa. Thus, 
we expect either a positive or negative relationship be-
tween age dependency and savings rates.
AGR refers to agriculture. It is measured as agriculture 
value as a percentage of GDP. The data were obtained from 
WDI. Given that a larger percentage of ECOWAS population 
engage in agricultural activity, it is obvious that many face 
uncertainty in their future income. Interestingly, researchers 
have pointed out that price fluctuations occasioned by the 
recent global financial crisis, increased uncertainty and risk 
and affected the economic status of commodity producers, 
consumers and traders (Pop, Rovinaru, and Rovinaru 2013). 
Skinner (1988) suggested that greater uncertainty about fu-
ture incomes compels consumers to set aside some resourc-
es for precautionary purposes. Chowdhury (2001) and Khan 
and Hye (2010) discovered that agricultural sector share in 
GDP has a positive impact on savings. Thus, we expect a 
positive relationship between agriculture share in GDP and 
savings rates.
POL refers to political instability. The variable has been 
measured by the number of people killed in domestic mass 
violence as a fraction of the total population, number of suc-
cessful coups, number of attempted but unsuccessful coups, 
or number of politically motivated assassinations (Alesina 
and Perotti 1996). However, due to the unavailability of such 
rich data for ECOWAS countries, the variable is proxied by 
the ICRG political risk rating or index. The ICRG index has 
many components, including political leadership, military 
presence in politics, external conflicts, organized religion in 
politics, racial and national tension, law and order, political 
terrorism, civil war, and political party development. Two 
other indicators were employed to serve as consistency and 
robustness checks for the results obtained using the ICRG in-
dex. They include the Global Insight Business Conditions and 
Risk Indicators (WMO) index, and the Cingranelli-Richards 
Human Rights Database and Political Terror Scale (HMO) in-
dex (obtained from Worldwide Governance Indicators). The 
ICRG index ranges between 0% and 100%, while the HMO 
and WMO indices range between 0 and 1. Higher values 
indicate higher political stability (lesser political instabil-
ity) and vice versa. Political instability disrupts production 
activity, destroys physical capital and displaces human capi-
tal, leading to high unemployment and lower savings (Le 
2004). On the other hand, political instability may promote 
precautionary savings to address great risks ahead, so that 
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higher instability would be associated with higher savings. 
The few studies conducted to assess the impact of political 
instability on savings indicate that political instability has a 
negative effect on savings (see Edwards 1996; Fielding 2003; 
Venieries and Gupta 1986). Thus, we expect a positive rela-
tionship between higher political stability (higher political 
risk rating) and savings rates.
POL*PCY refers to the political instability-income inter-
action and indicates that the impact of political instability 
on savings depends on income levels. Though political in-
stability tends to have adverse impact on savings, we expect 
income levels to moderate its impact on savings. Thus, the 
impact of political instability on savings should be lesser in 
higher income countries, but higher in low income countries 
such as ECOWAS. A potential problem that may arise using 
this variable is multicollinearity because the interaction 
term is calculated from POL and PCY, which are also present 
in the model. Therefore, multicollinearity is eliminated by re-
gressing POL*PCY on POL and PCY, and the residuals series 
is used in our estimation. 
It is important to mention that, of the 15 countries that 
make up the ECOWAS, only 13 were considered in this study. 
The remaining two (Benin and Cape Verde) were left out due 
to the unavailability of data on political instability indices 
for the countries. Moreover, we are missing data on other 
variables (in particular savings rates) for some years in cer-
tain countries, such as Liberia and Guinea Bissau. Thus, we 
are left with an unbalanced dataset of 121 observations. The 
period covered is 1996-2012.
PRESENTATION OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In the estimation of panel models that involve time-series 
and cross-sectional data (TSCS), one usually encounters 
problems of contemporaneous correlations and hetero-
scedasticity (Beck and Katz 1995). Therefore, any inferences 
drawn based on the standard errors obtained using the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator will be misleading. 
A better alternative is the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) 
method (Parks 1967). Employing the GLS to estimate mod-
els of TSCS requires one to have knowledge of the error 
process (auto-correlation and heteroscedasticity param-
eters), but this is usually not possible (Beck and Katz 1995). 
A superior method of estimation is the Feasible GLS (FGLS). 
Unfortunately, the FGLS tends to understate the exact vari-
ability of the estimates of the standard errors of the coef-
ficients (Beck and katz 1995).
The problems highlighted above can be avoided by 
using the Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) method 
(Beck and Katz 1995). The PCSE generates robust covari-
ances and accounts for deviations from the errors, leading to 
the ability to draw meaningful inferences. Also, it has been 
suggested that the PCSE performs better than the FGLS 
(Jonsson 2005) and it has been employed in recent studies 
(see, Bjørnstad and Nymoen 2008; Hanke and Hauser 2008; 
Juttner, Chung, and Leung 2006; Silaghi and Ghatak 2011). 
Thus, we employed the PCSE to estimate the savings mod-
els for ECOWAS countries.
In addition, we conducted redundant fixed effects and 
Hausman tests to select the most appropriate of the com-
peting models, which included pooled OLS, fixed effects 
(FE), and random effects (RE). The redundant fixed effects 
test tests the hypothesis of no time-specific effects in the es-
timates. If the test reveals the presence of effects, it is highly 
probable that the OLS estimator will not be a good predic-
tor of the cross section units over the time period. Similarly, 
the Hausman statistic is used to test the hypothesis that the 
RE estimates are consistent and preferable to FE estimates. 
Endogeneity
Studies have indicated that income GDP per capita/income 
growth is endogenous to savings (Baldé 2011; Loayza, 
Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén 1999; Sinha and Sinha 1998), 
suggesting that while increases in income per capita/in-
come growth results in higher savings, rising savings also 
leads to higher income per capita/income growth. The cau-
sality between savings and income/growth would lead to 
correlation between the control variables and disturbance 
term, and therefore violates the assumptions of the linear 
regression model (Baldé 2011). Besides, it is difficult to de-
termine the impact of the individual variable on savings, 
and estimating such a relationship leads to a potential en-
dogeneity bias.
One way to solve this problem is to employ the Two 
Stage Least Squares (TSLS)-instrumental variables method 
to estimate the relationship between savings and its po-
tential determinants. The technique involves finding vari-
ables that are highly correlated with the endogenous vari-
able, but uncorrelated with the disturbance term. While it is 
somewhat difficult to select the appropriate instruments to 
control for endogeneity, employing the lagged values of ex-
planatory variables which are also endogenous can be very 
helpful (Baldé 2011). For instance, Baldé (2011) employed 
the TSLS-instrumental variables method, which takes into 
account FE to estimate the relationship between savings/
investment and aid and remittances in SSA. The author used 
income per capita lagged by two periods as an instrument 
for income per capita. Thus, we follow Baldé’s approach in 
our estimation by using the TSLS. The Hausman test was 
also employed to determine whether FE or RE is to be used 
along with the TSLS estimator. Lastly, White’s method was 
used to correct for heteroscedasticity, and TSLS estimates 
were employed to serve as a consistency and robustness 
check for PCSE estimates.
Presentation of Results
Prior to estimation of the savings model, we conducted a 
correlation test on political instability indicators. The cor-
relation matrix reported in Table 1 suggests a strong cor-
relation between ICRG and WMO (r=0.76), ICRG and HMO 
(r=0.64), and HMO and WMO (r=0.53). These findings sug-
gest that the indicators are measuring the same thing.
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The results of estimations and tests conducted using the 
ICRG index are presented in Table 2. The result of the redun-
dant fixed effects test indicates the presence of effects in the 
estimates. The result of the Hausman test demonstrates that 
the RE estimates are preferable to FE estimates. The results 
of the RE estimation reveal that higher political stability 
(captured by a higher political risk rating) and the political 
instability-income interaction have a significant positive ef-
fect on savings. Other important determinants of savings 
include the inflation rate and agricultural share in GDP, with 
positive and negative effects, respectively.
In an attempt to check the consistency and robustness 
of the results obtained using the ICRG index, we re-estimat-
ed the savings models using the WMO and HMO indices. 
Although not presented here, the results are consistent. 
We went further to estimate our relationship using the 
OLS and TSLS estimators taking into account RE, as the re-
sults of the Hausman test indicated that models with RE 
would be preferable. Using the ICRG index, the results pre-
sented in Table 3 indicate that higher political stability has 
a significant positive effect on savings, and the impact of 
political instability on savings is higher at low income levels 
Table 1:  Correlation matrix for political instability indicators
ICRG WMO HMO
ICRG 1.00 – –
WMO 0.76 1.00 –
HMO 0.64 0.53 1.00
Note: ICRG is International Country Risk Guide, HMO is Cingranelli-
Richards Human Rights Database and Political Terror Scale, and 
WMO is Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk.
Table 2:  Estimation results using the ICRG index (Dependent variable: GSR)
Variables Pooled OLS FE RE
Constant -1.6926 84.181*** 13.4614
(15.246) (27.3159) (18.4148)
POL 0.1460** 0.1579* 0.1314**
(0.0642) (0.0899) (0.0773)
PCY 0.0043** 0.0026 0.0039
(0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0025)
POL*PCY -0.0001** -0.0009** -0.0008**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
GPCY 0.1438 0.1211 0.1170
(0.1159) (0.1208) (0.1093)
AGE 0.1359  -1. 975** -0.2055
(0.2982) (0.5685) (0.3806)
INF 0.325*** 0.2190 0.3085*
(0.0950) (0.2467) (0.1612)
RIR 0.2140* 0.2042 0.2320
(0.1230) (0.2550) (0.1726)
AGR -0.218** 0.1471 -0.166**
(0.0673) (0.1105) (0.0776)
R2 0.45 0.59 0.34
Redundant FE Test - 3.46 -
(0.0001)
Hausman Test (X2) - 0.00 -
(1.0000)
F-Stat. 11.54 8.19 7.33
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Obs. 121 121 121
Note: *, **, *** indicates significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Columns 3 & 4 are estimates generated using the robust coefficient 
covariance method, i.e. PCSE (Cross-section SUR). Standard errors are in parenthesis. A positive sign of POL indicates higher political stabil-
ity (lesser political instability).
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but lesser at high income levels. Other than our variables of 
interest, income per capita, inflation rate, and real interest 
rate all have a significant positive impact on savings, but the 
effect of agriculture on savings is negative. We also used the 
WMO and HMO indices to check for the consistency of the 
results obtained using the ICRG index. The results (though 
not presented here) are consistent.
Overall, the results of PCSE, OLS, and TSLS with RE illus-
trate that higher political stability is associated with higher 
savings, and higher income tends to reduce the impact of 
political instability on savings. Moreover, the OLS and TSLS 
estimates are identical for our variables of interest, indicat-
ing that the OLS estimates are consistent and unbiased. 
Therefore, endogeneity is not a problem in the estimated 
relationships, and there is no simultaneity between savings 
and income per capita/income growth. 
Discussion
The results reported above reveal that higher political leads 
to higher savings in ECOWAS countries. The finding con-
firms the outcome of previous studies (see, Edwards 1996; 
Fielding 2003; Venieries and Gupta 1986). Thus, declining po-
litical unrest/violence, higher stability in government, lesser 
ethno-religious conflict, etc., reduce uncertainties and risks 
associated with savings, and therefore promote savings mo-
bilization. Similarly, higher political stability promotes the 
enforcement of property rights and the guarantee of con-
tracts. This increases the assurance that individuals will en-
joy the returns/incomes on their savings/investment, lead-
ing to future higher savings. A politically stable atmosphere 
enhances production through higher savings and invest-
ment, to mention just a few. The increased output growth 
leads to higher employment and income, and savings.
The political instability-income interaction is significant 
and the variable has the expected sign (especially in the es-
timation that considered the ICRG index). This suggests that 
income level moderates the adverse effect of political insta-
bility on savings, so that at higher income levels the impact 
of political instability on savings is less. Since it has been sug-
gested that low income (lack of economic opportunities) is 
a major reason for political instability in ECOWAS countries 
(Akenroye 2012), higher incomes (and improvement in eco-
nomic conditions) will reduce discontent and dissatisfaction 
among the citizens, including socio-political unrest and fre-
quent changes in government. In fact, an improvement in 
incomes (economic conditions) has been found to promote 
political stability, including sustaining democracy (Adelman 
and Morris 1968; Feng 1997; Helliwell 1994). Thus, higher in-
come will reduce political instability in ECOWAS countries 
and promote savings mobilization.
Income per capita has a significant and positive effect 
on savings. This finding lends support to those reported in 
previous studies in developing countries (see Collins 1991; 
Elbadawi and Mwega 2000). Thus, rising income raises 
households’ ability to finance their consumption and saving 
of the remainder. Cross–country studies have indicated that 
high income countries save a higher percentage of their in-
come (Metin-Ozcan, Gunay, and Ertac 2003).
Inflation rate has a significant positive effect on sav-
ings. This outcome confirms those of previous studies (see 
Burnside, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén 1999; Callen and 
Thimann 1997; Hondroyiannis 2006; Hüfner and Koske 
2010; Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven 1999). Thus, 
higher inflation (a measure of macroeconomic uncertainty) 
raises uncertainty regarding future earnings, and therefore 
forces individuals to increase their savings on precaution-
ary grounds. Athukorala and Sen (2004) pointed out that 
households’ income is more uncertain in developing coun-
tries than their developed counterparts, making savings rise 
with the inflation rate. In-as-much as many households in 
ECOWAS countries are employed in the agricultural sector 
and face uncertainty with respect to their future incomes, 
they are compelled to save for precautionary purposes.
Real interest rate has a significant and positive effect 
on savings. The finding lends support to previous ones 
Table 3: Estimation results using the ICRG index (Dependent vari-
able: GSR)
Variables OLS/RE TSLS/RE
Constant 13.4614 -4.0378
(16.1078) (20.6255)
POL 0.1314** 0.2378**
(0.0605) (0.1141)
PCY 0.0039 0.0093*
(0.0030) (0.0049)
POL*PCY -0.0008*** -0.0007***
(7.68E-05) (9.33E-05)
GPCY 0.1170 -0.7784
(0.0931) (0.8461)
AGE -0.2055 -0.0484
(0.3534) (0.3985)
INF 0.3085* 0.3044*
(0.1741) (0.1817)
RIR 0.2320 0.4597*
(0.1515) (0.2452)
AGR -0.1663** -0.0225
(0.0761) (0.1180)
R2 0.34 0.03
F-Stat. 7.33 8.73
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Obs. 121 121
Note: *, **, *** indicates significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respec-
tively. White’s method correction was used to solve the problem 
of heteroscedasticity. Standard errors are in parenthesis. A posi-
tive sign of POL indicates higher political stability (lesser political 
instability).
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(see Athukorala and Tsai 2003; Callen and Thimann 1997; 
Burnside, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén 1999; Hondroyiannis 
2006; Hüfner and Koske 2010). Thus, increases in real inter-
est rate induce households to raise their savings in a bid to 
earn higher returns in the future. Lowering inflation rate in-
creases real interest rates (Edwards 1996).
Agriculture has a significant and negative effect on sav-
ings. This reflects a situation where the agricultural sector is 
highly underdeveloped and practised at subsistence level, 
implying low incomes for most households employed in the 
sector in ECOWAS countries. Thus, given low income levels 
and subsistence agricultural production, additional output 
will be consumed rather than sold to generate additional in-
come, leading to lower savings. In fact, poor households will 
often resort to drawing on past savings (if they have them at 
all) rather than raising savings. 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The ECOWAS region has not been able to mobilize the ad-
equate savings required for achieving higher rates of invest-
ment and growth. The region has also witnessed higher po-
litical instability and remains one of the world’s poorest and 
most unstable regions. This study employs PCSE, OLS and 
TSLS with random effects to investigate the effect of the po-
litical instability-income interaction on savings in ECOWAS 
countries. The PCSE, OLS and TSLS estimates are identical 
for our variables of interest (political instability and politi-
cal instability-income interaction). The empirical evidence 
indicates that a politically stable environment is required 
for the mobilization of higher savings in ECOWAS countries. 
Moreover, the results illustrate that the impact of political 
instability on savings is higher in ECOWAS countries due to 
their low income levels. Other important determinants of 
savings include income per capita, inflation rate, real inter-
est rate and agricultural share in GDP. Based on the findings, 
policies to raise incomes are required to promote political 
stability in order to raise savings in the region.
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